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Trump’s foreign policy is unlikely to beneﬁt from a “Madman”
advantage
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Nearly 50 years ago, Richard Nixon subscribed to the “Madman Theory” of international strategy;
that if foreign leaders were convinced that his extreme threats were credible, then he would have
greater leverage. Many commentators are now concerned that President Trump subscribes to a
similar theory of international relations. But, according to new research from Roseanne McManus,
Eileen Gerard, Vinuri Ranaweera, and Olivia Sztanga, the perception of “madness” may be
counterproductive towards leaders achieving their desired outcome.
What will the inauguration of Donald Trump as president mean for US foreign policy?  Some
commentators and media reports have speculated that Trump might be able to achieve foreign
policy successes due to the “Madman Theory” – a term coined by Richard Nixon for the strategy of
seeking to be viewed as irrational in order to gain greater international bargaining leverage. In new
research, we test the Madman Theory using new data on public perceptions of leaders and ﬁnd little
support for it.
The Madman Theory has some basis in academic thought. Rationalist explanations for war
emphasize that conﬂict is costly. Thus, rational leaders face an impediment to making credible
threats, particularly when the costs of war are high and the beneﬁts are lower. However, if a leader
is considered mad, in the sense of not weighing costs rationally, then the leader’s threats might be
more credible. Adversaries might prefer to yield to the demands of a “mad” leader rather than risk
war. Therefore, Nobel Prize-winning nuclear strategist Thomas Schelling wrote in his book Arms
and Inﬂuence that a “paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to
be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself.”
Despite this apparent madman advantage, the perception of madness may also have downsides.
As emphasized by Andrew Kydd and Roseanne McManus, in order to make successful threats, it is
not only necessary for a leader to convince an adversary that he/she is willing to use force if the
adversary does not comply with demands, but also that he/she will not use force if the adversary
does comply. If the adversary believes that they will be attacked regardless, then they will have no
incentive to acquiesce to demands. Therefore, if a leader is viewed as a madman who does not
respond to rational incentives, then other countries may see little to gain from making concessions
to the leader and more to gain from standing ﬁrm or even attacking preemptively.
Therefore, one perspective suggests that being viewed as a madman can be helpful in foreign relations, while
another perspective indicates that it may be detrimental. We collected data to see which perspective has more
support. We undertook a systematic search of news reports between 1986 and 2005 to identify which leaders were
most often described as crazy, insane, irrational, unpredictable, or erratic.
We use the new data to examine the eﬀect of perceived madness on the initiation and outcome of militarized
interstate disputes, which include actual uses of force as well as threats or displays of force (such as deploying
troops or sending a ship to disputed waters). Our statistical models control for other factors that might be relevant,
including leaders’ previous conﬂict history and the frequency with which leaders are described using another set of
adjectives associated with toughness.
Our ﬁrst statistical models examine the relationship between perceived leader madness and dispute initiation. Figure
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1 shows that perceived madmen are more likely to initiate military disputes and also more likely to be the target of
military disputes initiated by others. This is particularly true of “really mad” leaders, identiﬁed as those ranking in the
top 20 percent for the frequency with which they are described as crazy, insane, irrational, unpredictable, or erratic
(based on lagged averages). “Slightly mad” leaders, who are described using these adjectives less frequently, are
more likely to be targeted in disputes, but not signiﬁcantly more likely to initiate them.
Figure 1 – Military Dispute Probabilities
Thus, it appears that having a “madman” leader increases a country’s involvement in military disputes. This seems
to be a drawback of having a volatile leader. However, it could be argued that it is worthwhile to engage in military
disputes if the outcome advances the national interest. Therefore, we also consider what happens after leaders
become involved in military disputes.
First, we use a new statistical model to predict dispute reciprocation. Figure 2 shows that perceived madness
reduces the probability of reciprocation. If a “sane” leader initiates a dispute against another country, there is a 57
percent probability that the targeted country will reciprocate by making its own threat, show, or use of force against
the initiator. In contrast, if a “really mad” leader initiates a dispute, there is only a 43 percent probability of
reciprocation, meaning that the target is more likely to accept the initiator’s provocation passively.
Figure 2 – Predicted probabilities of reciprocation and winning
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On the other hand, when we look at the ultimate outcome of disputes in another statistical model, Figure 2 shows
that “really mad” leaders who initiate disputes are about two-thirds less likely than “sane” or “slightly mad” leaders to
obtain a winning outcome, in which the status quo changes favorably and/or the other party clearly yields. This
ﬁnding suggests that while “really mad” leaders may get away with some provocations, they are not often able to
shift the status quo in their country’s interest in a tangible way.
What does this mean for the “Madman Theory” and the Trump presidency?  The result for reciprocation oﬀers some
support for the Madman Theory, but the other results suggest that being perceived as mad is disadvantageous. One
complicating factor in interpreting the results is the relationship between the perception of madness and true
madness. While the perception of madness may possibly have beneﬁts, true madness is likely to cause leaders to
make strategic errors. In the case of Trump, it remains to be seen whether the volatility he demonstrates is genuine
or an act. Thus, this research cannot oﬀer a deﬁnitive prediction for Trump’s presidency. However, these ﬁndings
suggest that it is not very common for leaders to be able to use the perception of madness to great advantage.
This article is based on the working paper “Crazy Like a Fox? Do Leaders Perceived as Mentally Unstable Achieve
Better Conﬂict Outcomes?” which is available on the author’s website.
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